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4a

 More evidence that the Battle of Hastings was not fought at the orthodox Battle Abbey location

1. No Christian places of worship anywhere in the world have been constructed on a battlefield, with the alleged exception of Battle Abbey. There is good reason. Medieval people were terrified of revenants, especially of being haunted by the souls of unburied victims of violence. If Battle Abbey had been built on the battlefield, it would have been shunned by monks, churchgoers, and pilgrims.
2. Building a church on a battlefield would be widely perceived as the glorification of violence, something that Church authorities would abhor. William would have been especially conscious of this because he commissioned Battle Abbey as penance to earn the Pope's absolution for the violence and death he caused by the Conquest. The Pope is unlikely to have granted absolution for what would appear to be the cynical glorification of that violence.
3. Battle Abbey's original name was 'Sancti Martini de Bello', meaning 'Saint Martin of the War', appropriate because it was built as penance for the violence and death caused by the entire campaign, not just for that caused at the battlefield. It is worth noting that there was relatively little death and violence at the Battle of Hastings compared to subsequrnt events, escpecially the 'Harrowing of the north'. Latin had other words for a battle. If Battle Abbey had been built on the battlefield, it is likely to have been named 'Sancti Martini de Pugno', 'Saint Martin of the Battle', or similar.
4. Battle Abbey allegedly marks the exact location where Harold died, but it seems implausible that William have been so naive as to give Anglo-Saxons rebels a focal point to worship Harold as a martyr.

5. It was not near to any immense, deep and precipitous sided pits, let alone the three different pits descibred by Poitiers, the Chronicle of Battle Abbey, Orderic and Wace.
6. It contradicts Wace's detailed description of the Norman advance.
7. It was not adjacent to a lateral ditch, into which the Normans were shield charged according to Wace.
8. It does not have a plain below the proposed contact zone as described by Wace.
9. It is not overlooked by another hill, as described by Wace.
10. It is not a small hill as described by Pseudo-Ingulf
11. It is not narrow, as described by John of Worcester.
12. It has no reason for the fighting to be more intense in the middle, as described by Poitiers; indeed, the slope is steepest in the middle, so the opposite would have been more likely.
13. It was not steeper than the approach at the time, as described by Carmen (although some subsequent landscaping work means that it is now)
14. It is not on a spur, as described by Baudri.
15. It is not on a north-south ridge or spur, as described in the Chronicle of Battle Abbey.
16. It would not have been difficult to tightly encircle, as described by Poitiers.
17. It is not nine Roman miles from the orthodox Norman camp, as described by John of Worcester.
18. Its flight route would have been down the valley in which Marley Lane now runs, not through woodland, untrodden wastes, and land too rough to be tilled, as described by Carmen, Poitiers, Quedam Exceptione, and Wace
19. It was not adjacent to a wood in which the English camped, as described by Carmen.
20. It was not visible from the Norman battle camp, as described by Brevis Relatio, Baudri, Draco Normannicus and others.

21. The orthodox battlefield is inconsistent with William's battle tactics
    
    Shield walls proposed by Lieutenant-Colonel Burne (L) and Major James (R) with our red highlighting

    Every shield wall that has been proposed at the orthodox battlefield is open and straight or straightish. The two depicted on the image above were proposed by senior soldiers. Thirty more are depicted on our blog about the evolution of the orthodox battlefield theory, here.

    
    Battle Abbey narrow flanking options

    If William was faced with any shield wall that has been proposed for the orthodox Battle Abbey battlefield, he would have sent his cavalry around the open ends of the English line to attack Harold from behind and above. Considering that William nearly ran out of time to achieve victory before nightfall but could have ended a battle at the orthodox Battle Abbey battlefield location in 15 minutes by outflanking the English line, it is inconceivable that the battle was fought at the orthodox Battle Abbey location. Moreover, Baudri says that William posted horsemen behind the English line to prevent Harold trying to escape. But if the English line was open and there were Norman horsemen behind the English line, William would have commanded them to ride up behind Harold and lop off his head before the battle had even started.

22. The orthodox battlefield is inconsistent with Harold's battle tactics

    In a battle between a static shield wall faces and an enemy with a large contingent of archers and cavalry, the shield wall cannot win. Its best outcome is to survive. But if the English army was at the orthodox Battle Abbey battlefield location and Harold's objective was to survive, he would have melted away into nearby woodland and escaped through the Andredsweald. Harold's decision to establish a static shield wall and fight implies that the English army was trapped which would not have been possible at the orthodox Battle Abbey battlefield.

23. The orthodox battlefield is inconsistent with Harold's troop deployment

    Every shield wall that has been proposed at the orthodox Battle Abbey battlefield is open and straight or straightish. But Baudri specifically states and then reiterates that the shield wall was wedge-shaped, while both Carmen and Wace (five times) imply the same. Moreover, Poitiers, Wace, Carmen, Henry of Huntingdon, the Chronicle of Battle Abbey, Brevis Relatio and Draco Normannicus all say or imply that the shield wall was enclosed. And this makes perfect sense. It was standard practice in Roman times for infantry to form enclosed shapes to defend against cavalry. Harold Hardrada used the tactic to defend against the English cavalry at Stamford Bridge just two weeks before the Battle of Hastings. It is inconceivable that Harold would not have enclosed his shield wall to defend against the Norman cavalry.

24. The orthodox battlefield was not at or near somewhere anciently named 'Senlac', as described by Orderic Vitalis. If it was 'anciently named', the name is Old English, so it means 'sandy lake' or 'sandy loch'. This 'loch' would be in the medieval English sense of a body of water that is cut off at low tide. Neither term would apply to anywhere near Battle, which is located on the Hastings Ridge.
25. The orthodox battlefield was not at or near anywhere named Herste, as described by the Chronicle of Battle Abbey, at the time of the battle.
26. Hechelande, the location of the Norman battle camp according to the Chronicle of Battle Abbey, was not between the orthodox Norman sea camp and the orthodox battlefield at the time of the battle.

27. Absence of archaeological supporting evidence

    No archaeological evidence of a battle has been found at the orthodox battlefield despite multiple surveys and excavations. Whilst big and valuable battle artifacts would have been scavenged after the battle, and small iron artifacts might well have corroded to nothing, there should be evidence of smaller copper alloy items like strap ends, brooches and pins. Moreover, no archaeological evidence has been found of Anglo-Saxon era occupation.

4b

 Harold's route to the theatre of war

The diagram above shows that the English army had to cross the immense Andredsweald forest to get to the theatre of war. Harold had a choice: he could either use Watling Street and the Rochester Roman road which went to the theatre of war via Rochester, or he could go through the trees on the forest floor. It seems implausible that he would have used the forest floor, but almost every historian that has written about the battle assumes he did. It needs some explanation.

One crucial point, often fogotten, is that the English army would have had a huge baggage train of ox-drawn carts and wagons. Robert Evans, logistics expert and Head of the Army Historical Branch, estimates that they would have needed 100 carts, 200 oxen, just to carry tents. Heavily laden carts and heavy animals concentrate pressure on the ground, quickly turning earthen tracks into rutted gloop. When wheel ruts sink to half the depth of a cart's wheels, the axel gets stuck and the cart would have to be lifted to start a new track. Thus, wagon train progress on any surface other than a paved road was glacially slow. For instance, Daniel Defoe mentioned that it often took a year to haul logs out of the Andredsweald.

Two other points are worth making:

1. There is no reason to believe that forest tracks had been maintained since the Romans left. No Anglo-Saxon charters were issued to order their maintenance. Anglo-Saxon iron working in the Weald was rare and small scale. There were only a handful of Anglo-Saxon settlements in the forest. There was no incentive to maintain forest tracks and there were not enough inhabitants to do so anyway. Indeed, the evidence from clerical and royal itineraries indicates that wagon trains did not cross the Andredsweald on forest tracks until the 14th century when clearing was well underway. If it was too difficult to drive a few dozen royal or clerical carts through the Andredsweald on forest tracks, it is clearly implausible that Harold would try to drive hundreds of them.
2. The pivotting front axel had not yet been invented, so carts and wagons could not be steered. Even though the typical spacing between tree trunks in mature deciduous forest is ten metres, it was not much more than the length of an ox-drawn cart. In the absence of forest track maintenance - see 1 above - they would regularly get jammed between trees, only to be unjammed by being first unloaded.

Given these difficulties, had the English tried to cross the Andredsweald on forest tracks, it is implausible that they could have arrived at the theatre of war in time to fight the Battle of Hastings. Even if it were not so difficult, there are several good reasons Harold would have chosen not to drive his wagon train through the Andredsweald on forest tracks:

1. The role of commissariat had not yet been invented. Armies plundered food and ale (no one drank water in medieval times) as they went. They needed to plunder big farms and major settlements every day. These were commonplace near major Roman roads but absent in the Andredsweald.
2. It would have been dangerous. The forest was full of hiding places. William might have posted snipers in the trees to kill Harold before he arrived at the theatre of war, as William Rufus discovered to his cost a few decades later.

Why then do historians assme that Harold did cross the Andredsweald on forest tracks? Two factors are at play.

1. Historians did not know that the Rochester Roman road went to the Hastings Peninsula until Margary traced its route the 1950s. Pre-Margary historians assumed that Harold had to cross the Andredsweald on the forest floor, no matter how unlikely it seemed. They developed the orthodox narrative accordingly.
2. The route of the Rochester Roman road is inconsistent with the orthodox Battle Abbey battlefield location, as we explain in the adjacent five point summary. Post-Margary historians are loath to contradict the orthodox Battle of Hastings narrative or the orthodox Battle Abbey battlefield location, so they perpetuate the forest track narrative.

5a

 Eight reasons why Hurst Lane is the only viable battlefield

Wace provides a detailed and specific description of the Norman advance to the battlefield from their battle camp. He explains that Harold can see the Norman battle camp from battlefield, and vice versa. As the Normans advance, they go out of Harold's sight (2) before reappearing on the crest of a nearby hill (3). They march along the crest of that hill (4), cross a stream (5) and wheel into position at the bottom of the battlefield hill (6). This description exactly and uniquely matches the geography at Hurst Lane.

Poitiers, the Chronicle of Battle Abbey, Orderic, Wace, William of Malmesbury, Carmen and Quedam Exceptione give detailed descriptions of at least three immense non-fluvial pits near the battlefield that featured in different phases of the English flight. The Chronicle of Battle Abbey describes the first as immense, deep, surrounded by a rampart, precipitous-sided and 'where the fighting was going on'. It is the famous 'Malfosse' where many Norman horses and riders fell to their death. The English make a stand at a second pit where many Normans get onto the English side before being shield charged to their death into the pit. The English make a last stand at a third pit where Count Eustace was allegedly killed by a missile thrown across the pit from the English side.

These descriptions clearly refer to open cast iron ore mines. The LiDAR image above shows three immense deep iron ore mines at the Hurst Lane battlefield, uniquely and almost exactly matching the twelve descriptions of immense pits in the contemporary accounts listed above. The Malfosse is labelled M. The exception is that they are no longer surrounded by 'ramparts'. These ramparts would have been mining spoil that had been dumped around the rim of the pits. It has subsequently fallen into the pits when the sides collapsed. The pits would have been encountered as the English fled from the battlefield - shown as a magenta heart shape - to the Rochester Roman road, shown as a black line.

No contemporary archaeology has been found at the orthodox Battle Abbey battlefield or at any of the alternative battlefields. In the case of the accessible western side of Hurst Lane, if there was pre-WWII archaeology, it was removed when the topsoil was redistributed to practice building aircraft landing strips before D-Day. Elsewhere, there is no pre-indutrial revolution archaeology at the battlefield candidate or nearby. However, some very rare contemporary archaeology has been found on the route that the English would have fled from Hurst Lane to the Rochester Roman road through Killingan Wood. This includes a Norman manufactured horseshoe, Anglo-Saxon strapends, an Anglo-Saxon brooch, several Anglo-Saxon pins, and a tanged barbed arrowhead.

The Normans attacked up a steep slope, yet the English were not at the top of the battlefield hill, so something prevented them attacking downslope. The only hill in the theatre of war that was impregnable to downhill attack was Hurst Lane, where the upper side of the battlefield was protected by an immense iron ore pit.

The Chronicle of Battle Abbey says that the battle was fought at Herste. The Domesday manor of Herste surrounded modern Hurst Lane, Hurst Wood and Hurst House, all of which were previously spelled 'Herste'. This clue uniquely matches Hurst Lane, Sedlescombe.

The stream to the west of the Hurst Lane battlefield is named Devil's Brook. This is the stream into which Wace says that one flank of the Norman army was shield charged, where more Normans died than in the rest of the battle combined. Perhaps its name is in remembrance of this event. It is true that 'devil' is an Old English word whereas it was the Normans that were killed, but it seems likely that the Anglo-Saxon locals avoided it for fear of wraiths and revenants.

The wood to the north of the Hurst Lane battlefield is named Killingan Wood. This is the wood through which the English fled and where, according to the Chronicle of Battle Abbey, where most of them were killed. 'Killingan' derives from the Old English word 'quillen' meaning 'to kill'. Perhaps its name is in remembrance of the lives lost within.

Herste manor appears in Domesday. It is one of only a few dozen manors in the entire country that was held by an Anglo-Saxon, namely Ednoth. Perhaps these manors were given to Anglo-Saxons because Normans refused to farm them. It would be no surprise if Herste which would have been considered one of the most haunted places in the country. The other battlefield candidates are either absent from Domesday or held by a Norman.

5b

 Battlefield clues that are inconsistent with all battlefield candidates except Hurst Lane

More than a third of the Norman army was Knights and archers. The English army was entirely infantrymen. In a pre-firearm battle between infantry and cavalry, the infantry can only be deployed as a static enclosed shield wall. The shield wall cannot win. Its best outcome is to survive, and even a minor lapse of discipline - which was almost inevitable when more than 80% of the English army were farmers - would lead to disastrous defeat. Yet the relative safety of dense woodland was less than two miles from any of the battlefield candidates. Harold and his brothers could have cantered to complete safety beyond the River Rother in 20 minutes from any of the battlefield candidates. The only credible explanation for Harold's decision to fight is that the English were trapped. The only battlefield candidate where the English could have been trapped is Hurst Lane, where the retreat could be blocked by occupying the Udimore Ridge at Cripps Corner.

William had a huge cavalry, Harold had none. It is implausible that William would fail to outflank the English line if it had been deployed, as tradition dictates for the orthodox battlefield, as a straight or straightish open line. This same issue applies to the straight or straightish open lines proposed at Caldbec Hill and Telham Hill. Nine contemporary accounts say or imply that the English shield wall was enclosed, as would be expected for a battle between infantry and cavalry. Accordingly, the proposed shield walls at Hurst Lane, Old Heathfield and Blackhorse Hill are enclosed. However, both the latter are relatively long: 2.5km and 2.0km respectively. They would be no more than four ranks deep on average, probably fewer. William would clearly have used his cavalry to probe for weaknesses all along the line, then attack using an oblique order attack at weak points. This is not the battle described in the contemporary accounts, so it did not happen at Old Heathfield or Blackhorse Hill. Thus, William's tactics are only consistent with Hurst Lane, where he was unable to outflank or outmanouevre the English line because it was impregnably protected on three sides by iron ore pits and lateral streams.

Carmen explains that standards at the English camp are visible from the Norman battle camp. This is straightforward at Hurst Lane which is less than 2km from the Norman battle camp at Cottage Lane with an unobstructed view across the Brede estuary. The view from the orthodox Norman battle camp at Telham Hill towards the orthodox English camps at Caldbec Hill (or perhaps at Battle) is obstructed by the shoulder of Loose Farm spur. The view from Nick Austen's Norman battle camp at Upper Wilting towards his proposed battlefield at Telham Hill and towards David Barnby's at Blackhorse Hill is obstructed by Green Street spur and by the distance (over two miles).

Baudri, Brevis Relatio, Draco Normannicus and others explain that William can see the English troop deployment from the Norman battle camp. Again, this is straightforward at Hurst Lane where the distance to the Norman battle camp is less than a mile and the view unobstructed across the Brede estuary, but not so elsewhere. Again, the view from Telham Hill towards Battle is obstructed by the shoulder of Loose Farm spur, the view from Upper Wilting towards Telham Hill and Blackhorse Hill is obstructed by Green Street spur.

Wace explains that there is a plain below the contact zone into which the English are drawn by feigned retreats and slaughtered. There is a plain 25m below the Hurst Lane contact zone, but none at any of the other battlefield candidates.

Pseudo-Ingulf says that Harold is killed on a small hill. Hurst Lane is just 65m elevation and 300m wide, the only one of the battlefield candidates that could be described as a 'small hill'. By comparison, Battle Ridge is 85m elevation and 2km wide, Telham Hill is 100m elevation and 700m wide, Caldbec Hill is 105m elevation and 600m wide, Blackhorse Hill is 145m elevation and 650m wide, Hugletts Farm is 175 elevation and 700m wide.

John of Worcester says that 'the English were drawn up in a narrow place'. As we say in the point above, Hurst Lane is just 300m wide, less than half the width of the narrowest of the other battlefield candidate and about a seventh the width of the orthodox battlefield.

Poitiers explains that William places himself and his elite Norman cavalry in the middle of three divisions where he thinks that 'the fighting will be hottest'. This would accurately describe the geography at Hurst Lane where the flanks were less than 100m making them susceptible to being shield charged into the flanking streams. Indeed, the flanks for the Normans that the only combat would have taken place in the middle division. The other battlefield candidates were so wide that the reverse would have been the case: the fiercest fighting would have been on the flanks.

Baudri states several times that the English deployment was wedge-shaped. The only likely explanation is that they were deployed on the crest of a spur. Wace states that the men of Kent had the honour of being at the front of the English shield wall where they would be the first to engage the enemy. This is only plausible if the English deployment was wedge-shaped or chevron-shaped, which is only likely if they were deployed on the crest of a spur. Hurst Lane is the only battlefield candidate on the crest of a spur.

The Chronicle of Battle Abbey states that the monks of Marmoutiers start to build William's penance abbey 'somewhat lower down [from the part of the batlefield hill where the fighting took place], on the western side of the hill'. It goes on to explain that William instructed them to abandon that work and to build his abbey where it now stands. It says that the chosen spot is where Harold died, but that statement is untrustworthy for many reasons we address in the 'Traditional battlefield' of our book. The point is that the battlefield was near the top of a hill. It would be pointless to say that the aborted abbey is 'lower down' unless it is trying to say that it was 'lower down the crest of the spur or ridge'. Hurst Lane is the only battlefield candidate whre this statement makes sense.

Poitiers says that the English line was difficult to encircle, even late in the day. He is trying to say that it was tactically impractical to tightly encircle, thereby allowing the Normans to stretch the defence and implement 'oblique order attacks' at the relative weak points. Hurst Lane is the only battlefield candidate where this would apply. The upper slope side of the English shield wall was impregnable, protected by the vertical wall of a deep iron ore mine. The flanks were susceptible to being shield charged into one of the flanking streams. Indeed, Wace says that this happened early in the battle, and that more Normans died in this shield charge than in the rest of the battle combined. There is no reason that the proposed shield walls at the other battlefield candidates could not be tightly encircled. It is true that there were relatively steep slopes to the north of the orthodox battlefield, to the east of Telham Hill, to the west of Blackhorse Hill, but the streams at the bottom of those slopes were 200m or more from the contact points. It would not have been possible for the English to shield charge the Normans 200m, so the Normans would not have feared venturing onto these slopes.

Bayeux Tapestry scene 48 shows William standing outside a Romanesque church during the Norman advance from their battle camp to the battlefield. Romanesque churches were extraordinarily rare in Anglo-Saxon England. The only likely Romanesque church in the theatre of war would have belonged to the Norman Abbey of Fécamps which had been gifted the manors of Rameslie and Brede by King Cnut. The most likely location for this church would have been adjacent to the Rochester Roman road, where it could collect taxes from passing freight carriers. Beryl Lucey stated that there was an Anglo-Saxon era church on the site now occupied by the Norman church of St John the Baptist, Sedlescombe. That church would have been in the right vicinity to have been the church depicted in scene 48. We have marked it 48 on the LiDAR image above.

Bayeux Tapestry scene 54 shows the English troops fighting back-to-back on top of a narrow hill. It exactly matches the view of our proposed Hurst Lane battlefield as seen from the knoll labelled 54 on the LiDAR image above.

Bayeux Tapestry scene 58, the last scene on the Tapestry, shows the English fleeing after the battle. It seems to be a weird double decker scene that has defied understanding hitherto. However, uniquely, it exactly matches the view looking north from the south rim of the middle iron ore pit, labelled 58 on the LiDAR above, with the English fleeing along the rim of the pit and across the bottom of the pit.

Orderic Vitalis repeatedly says that the battlefield was at a place 'anciently known as Senlac'. 'Anciently known' implies that Senlac is an Old English name, which therefore means 'sandy lake' or 'sandy loch'. In medieval England, a 'loch' usually referred to a stretch of intertidal water cut off at low tide. In medieval times, there was a low-tide ford south of Brede village, so the Brede estuary between Sedlescombe and Brede village was both a loch and a lake. It sat between the Norman battle camp at Cottage Lane and the battlefield at Hurst Lane. The term is inconsistent with all the other battlefield candidates, none of which were near a tidal river.

Supporters of every battlefield candidate propose a nearby ditch as the Malfosse. They are all fluvial valleys, and therefore not the Malfosse because it was a non-fluvial pit. However, in principle, they could be Wace's shield charge ditch. The devil is in the detail. The valley needs to be parallel to the battlefield because Wace says that the Normans pass it without noticing on their advance. The stream at the valley bottom valley must be near enough for a shield charge, and not through woodland. Oakwood Ghyll, the traditional Malfosse is over a kilometer from the orthodox Battle Abbey battlefield and therefore too far to be shield charged. It is 300m from the Caldbec Hill battlefield candidate, too far we think for a shield charge. Hunter's Ghyll is only 50m from Austin's proposed east flank, but Austin's engagement theory is based on it being impenetrable woodland. He cannot have it both ways: either it is impenetrable woodland, in which case the Normans could not be shield charged through it, or it is not impenetrable woodland, in which case the battle did not happen on Telham Hill. The Rackwell Stream west of Barnby's Blackhorse Hill battlefield is 200m from the contact zone, a long way to be shield charged. The Bingletts Wood stream is 400m from the Old Heathfield battlefield candidate, too far to be shield charged. Devil's Brook is just 120m from the Hurst Lane battlefield contact zone and immediately behind the Norman left flank. If the Normans left a 40m gap to avoid being hit by missiles, Devil's Brook would have been just 30m behind their last rank, easily within shield charge range.

5c

 Some more battlefield location clues

Wace explains that the youths and clerics watch the battle from an adjacent hill. This would have been straightforward at Hurst Lane because it is overlooked by the adjacent Churchlands Lane spur which is treeless and 10m higher. The orthodox battlefield is overlooked by a hill at what used to be Down Barn Farm, west of Loose Farm. Caldbec Hill and Hugletts Farm are the highest hill in their vicinity, and therefore are not overlooked. Austin's Telham Hill battlefield and Barmby's Blackhorse Hill battlefield are both overlooked by the Hastings Ridge, and they are only separated by one kilometre. If there were no trees on the Ridge or surrounding the battlefield, a spectator could see the action from the Ridge or from the other battlefield candidate. However, both engagement theories rely on the battlefield being surrounded by impenetrable woodland, in which case neither would be visible from a nearby hill.

This apparently specific clue from John of Worcester is not as useful as it seems because he is unclear about whether he means crow flying miles or marching miles. Hurst Lane is the only battlefield candidate that exactly matches this clue, being eight imperial marching and crow flying miles from our proposed Norman camp at modern Winchelsea. It clearly contradicts Telham Hill and Blackhorse Hill, both of which are less than two miles from their proposed Norman camp at Upper Wilting. It clearly contradicts Old Heathfield which is seventeen crow flying miles from the orthodox Norman camp at modern Hastings. The orthodox battlefield at Battle Abbey and the Caldbec Hill battlefield candidate are just shy of eight marching miles from the orthodox Norman camp at modern Hastings, although considerably less crow flying miles.

Carmen says that William can see Harold over the heads of the shield wall. This can only mean that the battlefield is steeper than the approach. This is clearly the case at Hurst Lane, where there is a level plain just below the contact zone and a relatively shallow approach to it from the river. The orthodox battlefield contact zone is steeper than the approach, but the ground has been relandscaped since the battle so it is difficult to know what it was like at the time. The slope at Telham Hill is consistent, so it is not steeper than the approach. The opposite applies at Blackhorse Hill and Caldbec Hill where the proposed shield wall is at the inflection point where a relatively flat hilltop breaks into a relatively steep slope, the exact opposite of what Carmen describes.

Carmen explains that Normans see the English emerge onto the battlefield from the wood in which they camped. This exactly describes Hurst Lane which backs onto Killingan Wood where we propose the English camped. Alas, the description is not specific enough to be sure about some of the other canidates. We assume that Carmen means that barons at the Norman battle camp saw the English emerge from the wood, which would narrow the possibilities because very few battlefield candidates were visible from their proposed battle camp, but Carmen does not say so explicitly. A broader interpretation, meaning that the English emerged from any wood, makes it consistent with Telham Hill and Blackhorse Hill, both of which back onto the Hastings Ridge which would have been lined with woodland. Even this broad interpretation is inconsistent with Caldbec Hill and Old Heathfield, both of which are supposed to have been on unwooded hilltops.

These descriptions are culled from Carmen, Poitiers, Quedam Exceptionne and Wace. The only battlefield candidate that matches all of them is Hurst Lane which backed onto Killingan Wood, which was surrounded by a moonscape of iron ore pits and spoil hills, and which was just a few hundred metres from the Rochester Roman road. All the other battlefield candidates would have been near woodland. All the other battlefield candidates might have been near ridgeway byways, although it is a stretch to think that this is what Poiters and Wace are referring to. And it is difficult to know what Poitiers meant by 'untrodden wastes'.

Many contemporary accounts state that the battle started at the third hour of the day. Allowing time for Mass, breakfast, the ride from the Norman sea camp to the battle camp, getting dressed into armour and listening to William's pep talk, there would have been no more than an hour for the Normans to get from their battle camp to the foot of the battlfield hill. This is consistent with the two kilometer march from our proposed Norman battle camp at Cottage Lane to Brede Lane on the route described by Wace. It could be consistent with Telham Hill and Blackhorse Hill if there was a road across the intervening marshland, although there is no evidence of such a road. It could be consistent with Old Heathfield if the Norman battle camp was where Welchman and Coleman propose at Dallington.